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I. INTRODUCTION
“[O]ne of the most significant problems facing the United States
patent system is the spiraling cost and complexity associated with pat2
ent rights.” The perception exists that the U.S. patent adjudication
system is beset with inefficiencies, inconsistencies, and forum shopping.3 At the same time, the perceived value of patents in a global,
knowledge-based society is increasingly important to business and the
4
economy.
A series of bills have been introduced to solve these problems in
the U.S. patent system by the creation of experienced patent judges in
the district courts. The first of these bills, H.R. 5418, introduced into
the House of Representatives on May 18, 2006,5 would provide funds
to establish a pilot program that would train district judges in handling
6
patent cases and add trained clerks. H.R. 5418 was never enacted
2
ADVISORY COMM. ON PATENT LAW REFORM, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF
COMM. 75 (1992), available at http://ipmall.info/hosted_resources/lipa/patents/patentact/
ACPLR-3.pdf.
3
See Improving Federal Court Adjudication of Patent Cases: Hearing before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary
[SUBCOMM. REPORT], 109th Cong. 2 (2005).
4
See id.
5
See http://thomas.loc.gov/home/c109bills.html (follow “5401-5500” hyperlink; then follow “H.R.5418.RFS” hyperlink; then follow “Bill Summary & Status” hyperlink; then follow
“All Information” hyperlink).
6
H.R. 518 reads:
AN ACT
To establish a pilot program in certain United States district courts to encourage enhancement of expertise in patent cases among district judges.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. PILOT PROGRAM IN CERTAIN DISTRICT COURTS.
(a) Establishment(1) IN GENERAL- There is established a program, in each of the United States district courts designated under subsection (b), under which--
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(A) those district judges of that district court who request to hear cases under which
one or more issues arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents or plant variety
protection must be decided, are designated by the chief judge of the court to hear those
cases;
(B) cases described in subparagraph (A) are randomly assigned to the judges of the
district court, regardless of whether the judges are designated under subparagraph (A);
(C) a judge not designated under subparagraph (A) to whom a case is assigned under
subparagraph (B) may decline to accept the case; and
(D) a case declined under subparagraph (C) is randomly reassigned to one of those
judges of the court designated under subparagraph (A).
(2) SENIOR JUDGES- Senior judges of a district court may be designated under
paragraph (1)(A) if at least 1 judge of the court in regular active service is also so designated.
(3) RIGHT TO TRANSFER CASES PRESERVED- This section shall not be construed to limit the ability of a judge to request the reassignment of or otherwise transfer a
case to which the judge is assigned under this section, in accordance with otherwise applicable rules of the court.
(b) Designation- The Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts shall, not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, designate
not less than 5 United States district courts, in at least 3 different judicial circuits, in which
the program established under subsection (a) will be carried out. The Director shall make
such designation from among the 15 district courts in which the largest number of patent
and plant variety protection cases were filed in the most recent calendar year that has
ended, except that the Director may only designate a court in which-(1) at least 10 district judges are authorized to be appointed by the President, whether
under section 133(a) of title 28, United States Code, or on a temporary basis under other
provisions of law; and
(2) at least 3 judges of the court have made the request under subsection (a)(1)(A).
(c) Duration- The program established under subsection (a) shall terminate 10 years
after the end of the 6-month period described in subsection (b).
(d) Applicability- The program established under subsection (a) shall apply in a district court designated under subsection (b) only to cases commenced on or after the date
of such designation.
(e) Reporting to Congress(1) IN GENERAL- At the times specified in paragraph (2), the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, in consultation with the chief judge of
each of the district courts designated under subsection (b) and the Director of the Federal
Judicial Center, shall submit to the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report on the pilot program established under subsection (a). The report shall include-(A) an analysis of the extent to which the program has succeeded in developing expertise in patent and plant variety protection cases among the district judges of the district
courts so designated;
(B) an analysis of the extent to which the program has improved the efficiency of the
courts involved by reason of such expertise;
(C) with respect to patent cases handled by the judges designated pursuant to subsection (a)(1)(A) and judges not so designated, a comparison between the 2 groups of judges
with respect to-(i) the rate of reversal by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, of such cases
on the issues of claim construction and substantive patent law; and
(ii) the period of time elapsed from the date on which a case is filed to the date on
which trial begins or summary judgment is entered;
(D) a discussion of any evidence indicating that litigants select certain of the judicial
districts designated under subsection (b) in an attempt to ensure a given outcome; and
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into law, but was reintroduced largely unchanged in the 110th Congress as H.R. 34 and again in the 111th Congress as H.R. 628.
These bills are based on the premise that “[p]atent lawyers, academics and judges appear to agree that judicial expertise in patent law
7
is particularly desirable,” and that this expertise is currently lacking.
District court judges do not have enough exposure to patent cases
because such cases comprise such a small percentage of their total
workloads.8 In support of this premise, a top patent jurist noted that,
in the Northern District of Illinois, one of the historically busiest district courts in terms of patent filings, he never had more than 5% of
his caseload as patent cases.9
Working on the notion that practice makes perfect, H.R. 5418
and its progeny propose a system that assigns patent cases to willing
judges interested in hearing patent cases.10 As a result, the reversal
11
rates should be lower for a judge that hears more patent cases.
(E) an analysis of whether the pilot program should be extended to other district
courts, or should be made permanent and apply to all district courts.
(2) TIMETABLE FOR REPORTS- The times referred to in paragraph (1) are-(A) not later than the date that is 5 years and 3 months after the end of the 6-month
period described in subsection (b); and
(B) not later than 5 years after the date described in subparagraph (A).
(3) PERIODIC REPORTING- The Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, in consultation with the chief judge of each of the district courts designated under subsection (b) and the Director of the Federal Judicial Center, shall keep
the committees referred to in paragraph (1) informed, on a periodic basis while the pilot
program is in effect, with respect to the matters referred to in subparagraphs (A) through
(E) of paragraph (1).
(f) Authorization for Training and Clerkships- In addition to any other funds made
available to carry out this section, there is authorized to be appropriated not less than
$5,000,000 in each fiscal year for-(1) educational and professional development of those district judges designated under subsection (a)(1)(A) in matters relating to patents and plant variety protection; and
(2) compensation of law clerks with expertise in technical matters arising in patent
and plant variety protection cases, to be appointed by the courts designated under subsection (b) to assist those courts in such cases.
Amounts made available pursuant to this subsection shall remain available until expended.
Passed the House of Representatives September 28, 2006.
Attest:
KAREN L. HAAS
Clerk.
H.R. 5418, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006) available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi.
bin/query/z?c109: H.R. 5418.RFS: (last visited Mar. 14, 2007) .
7
SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 3, at 21 (statement of John B. Pegram, Senior Counsel,
New York Office, Fish & Richardson, P.C.).
8
See James F. Holderman, Judicial Patent Specialization: A View from the Trial Bench,
2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 425, 429 (2002).
9
See id.
10 See H.R. 5418, supra note 7.
11 See SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 3, at 57.
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H.R. 5418, while less controversial than other proposals such as
those creating specialized trial courts, will have little impact if the
procedures proposed by this bill are in fact already in practice in the
district courts hearing a large volume of patent cases and if the procedures do not achieve the desired results. The practice of handing off
patent cases to willing judges who like taking them is an unofficial
12
practice today in some district courts. As one judge admits, “A lot of
my colleagues hate patent cases. Hate them. They say, ‘I tell you
13
what, if you do my patent case, I’ll do five ERISA cases.’”
Further, institutionalizing the practice of using one or two specialized judges per district court will only exacerbate the existing
problem of forum shopping. An unexpected consequence may also be
an increase in the time to resolve cases because of a shortage of specialized judges.
This analysis examines five of the top 10 districts that have historically had the highest volume of patent cases. For each of these
five districts, the percentage of patent cases heard by each judge is
examined. Based on the testimony and hearing transcripts, patent
cases should be equally distributed in small percentages to each
judge. If a court’s patent case assignment has a non-random distribution similar to that proposed by H.R. 5418, the reversal rates and
resolution times should give insight into the success of the proposal.
If the court exhibits a random patent case assignment, the expectation is for a higher reversal rate. Similarly, the reversal rate should
be inversely proportional to the volume of patent cases. If this correlation is not evident, then other factors such as local case rules will be
analyzed for each studied court, to see if there is any correlation to
success or failure.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Overview of the U.S. Patent System
The Patent Clause of the United States Constitution grants Congress authority to legislate over patents: “Congress shall have Power .
. . To promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts, by securing for limited

12 Interview with Hannibal Travis, former law clerk in the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California, and Assistant Professor of Law, Florida International University,
College of Law, Miami, Fla. (discussing patent case assignment practices). See
http://law.fiu.edu/faculty /faculty_travis.htm.
13 Kathleen M. O’Malley, Patti Saris, & Ronald H. Whyte, A Panel Discussion: Claim
Construction from the Perspective of the District Judge, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 671, 683 n.31
(2004).
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Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their . .. Discoveries.”
However, the foundation for the modern patent examination system
15
was not laid until the Patent Act of 1836. The Patent Act of 1836
“created the Patent Office, a corps of examiners, modern interference
practice, administrative appeal practice, and the modern patent num16
bering system.”
By the 1970s, the growth of the number of appeals and a shortage
of appellate judges had created an enormous problem in the U.S.
Federal Judiciary.17 Regional circuit courts heard complex patent
cases, resulting in acute problems of forum shopping and lack of uniformity in the area of patent law.18 An overcrowded Supreme Court
docket and the complexity of resolving circuit splits in patent cases
19
compounded these problems. Congress formed the Hruska Commission to make recommendations for reform.20 “[T]he commission
identified a lack of uniformity in U.S. patent law across the geographical [jurisdictions of the District Courts],” resulting in a wide
variation “in the frequency with which they upheld the validity of pat21
22
ents.” This variation caused a great deal of forum shopping. “[T]he
Hruska Commission recommended that a national appeals court be
created to handle patent litigation. . . .”23
The present patent court system dates from the 1982 Federal
24
Courts Improvement Act. The Federal Courts Improvement Act
created the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
25
(“CAFC”). Two earlier courts were essentially merged to form the
CAFC: the United States Court of Claims and the United State Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals.26 The 73 year-old United States
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was primarily responsible for
deciding appeals from decisions of the Patent and Trademark Office
14

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
See Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress to Useful Arts: American Patent
Law and Administration, 1787-1836 (Part 11), 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC”Y 61, 61
(1997).
16 Id.
17 See Matthew D. Henry & John L. Turner, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s
Impact on Patent Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 85, 85 (2006).
18 See A.B.A. TASK FORCE [TASK FORCE], ANTITRUST LAW SECTION, REPORT ON THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 8 (2002), available at
http://www.abanet.org/ antitrust/at-comments /2002/reports/federalcircuitreport.pdf.
19 See id. at 9.
20 See Henry, supra note 17, at 85-86.
21 Id.
22 See id.
23 Id. at 86.
24 See TASK FORCE, supra note 18, at 6.
25 See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982).
26 See TASK FORCE, supra note 18, at 6.
15
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(“PTO”) about patent applications and trademark registrations. The
CCPA’s jurisdiction also allowed it to hear appeals from the Court of
International Trade, primarily dealing with the Smoot-Hawley Tariff
Act. 28 Jurisdiction included appeals from the United States International Trade Commission (“ITC”), dealing with patent infringement
by imported goods or by imported goods made with patented U.S.
processes.29 Among other issues, the Court of Claims dealt with compensation for claims arising from patent infringement against the
United States, and had exclusive jurisdiction over patents invented for
the United States.30
1.

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(“CAFC”)

In response to these problems, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) was established as an Article III
court on October 1, 1982.31 Unlike the other circuit courts’ regional
jurisdictions, the CAFC has national jurisdiction in certain subject
32
areas including, inter alia, patents and trademarks. See Figure 1.
Figure 1. Patent Jurisdiction of the CAFC

33

Supreme Court of the
United States

U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (CAFC)

U.S. District Courts:
- Patent
- Plant Varieties

U.S. Patent Office

International Trade
Commission

The CAFC has twelve judges, appointed for life by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate.34 Judges may elect to take
27 See John B. Pegram, Should There Be a U.S. Trial Court with a Specialization in Patent
Litigation?, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 765, 771 (2000).
28 See id.
29 See id.
30 See id.
31 See About the Court, FEDERAL CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/about.html.
32 See id. Other subject areas include a wide variety: international trade, government
contracts, certain money claims against the federal government, and veteran’s benefits. See id.
33 See Pegram, supra note 27 at 767.
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senior status when eligible and handle fewer cases than an active
35
judge. Each judge has one judicial assistant; active service judges
36
employ three law clerks while senior judges only have one law clerk.
37
“Most of the law clerks have a technical degree . . .” In addition to
law clerks with technical backgrounds, there is also a senior technical
38
assistant and three technical assistants to the court. The technical
assistants also have technical backgrounds.39 The technical assistants
assist the judges in reviewing cases before oral argument, by doing
legal research, drafting memoranda, and participating in the court’s
process for avoiding conflicts in published opinions.40 Technical assistants also comment on the opinions circulated by the judges.41
As of 2001, four of the twelve Federal Circuit judges had techni42
cal backgrounds, although they all hired law clerks with various
technical backgrounds.43 Today the composition of technical and nontechnical background of the Federal Circuit judges is similar. The
four judges with technical backgrounds from the Moore study are still
on the bench.44 Of particular note is that two of the other judges with
non-technical degrees have extensive patent law experience; one has
45
authored a textbook on patent law. The newest addition is the author of the Moore Study, Judge Kimberly A. Moore, with an exten46
sive scholarly background in patent law.
Today, almost 20% of the CAFC’s crowded docket deals with
patent appeals.47 Congress expected the creation of the CAFC to give
48
judges time for examining and deciding these more complex issues.
However, in a typical month, a CAFC judge receives over 2,000 pages

34

See About the Court, supra note 31.
See id.
36 See id.
37 Setsuko Asami, Japan-U.S. Patent Infringement Litigation Comparison: A Visit to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 5 CASRIP NEWSLETTER, Fall 1998,
http://www.law. washington.edu/CASRIP/Newsletter/Vol5/newsv5i3asami.htm.
38 See id. at Figure 3.
39 See id.
40 See id.
41 See id.
42 See Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?,
12 FED. CIR. B.J. 1, 15 n.71 (2002).
43 See id. at 15.
44 See
id. at 15 n.71; see also Judicial Biographies, FEDERAL CIRCUIT,
http://www.cafc.uscourts. gov/judgbios.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2006).
45 Judges Paul R. Michel and Randal R. Rader, respectively. See Judicial Biographies,
supra at note 44; see also Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve
Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 24 n. 97 (2001).
46 See Judicial Biographies, supra note 44.
47 See Pegram, supra note 27 at 771.
48 See id.
35
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of briefs and averages slightly more than one appeal per day. Because patents are time consuming, the amount of deliberation and
time available to spend on the relatively more complex patent appeals
does not measure up to the CAFC creator’s expectations.50 Given
that district court holdings are reversed at least 35% of the time, there
51
is little penalty to appeal. See Table 1.
Table 1. Percentage of CAFC Workload from Patents 2000-2006.
Percentage of CAFC
52

Workload

2000

USPTO

6.03%

2001

53

4.99%

2002

54

4.63%

2003

55

4.60%

2004

56

4.02%

2005

57

4.12%

2006

58

4.06%

ITC

0.13%

0.54%

0.51%

0.91%

0.57%

0.45%

0.51%

U.S. District Courts

30.15%

27.17%

27.46%

32.99%

30.03%

31.38%

29.46%

2. United States Patent Office (“USPTO”)
The Department of Commerce’s United States Patent Office is
the administrative agency responsible for granting patents.59 The
USPTO does not have a direct role in patent infringement actions.60
61
The USPTO does not have any formal patent opposition procedure.
The types of issues that may go up on appeal to the CAFC are
reexamination of patents, reissue applications, or inter-party interference proceedings.62 Other patentability issues may be raised at the
interference proceedings.63 In lieu of an appeal to the CAFC, a dis49

See id.
See id.
51 See SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 3, at 4 (2005).
52 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE FED. CTS., 2000 ANN. REP. 119, Table B-8, available
www.cafc. uscourts.gov/pdf/b08sep00.pdf.
53 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE FED. CTS., 2001 ANN. REP. 115, Table B-8, available
www.cafc. uscourts.gov/pdf/b08sep01.pdf.
54 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE FED. CTS., 2002 ANN. REP. 114, Table B-8, available
www.cafc. uscourts.gov/pdf/b08sep02.pdf.
55 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE FED. CTS., 2003 ANN. REP. Table B-8, available
www.cafc. uscourts.gov/pdf/b08sep03.pdf.
56 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE FED. CTS., 2004 ANN. REP. Table B-8, available
www.cafc. uscourts.gov/pdf/b08sep04.pdf.
57 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE FED. CTS., 2005 ANN. REP. Table B-8, available
www.cafc. uscourts.gov/pdf/b08sep05.pdf.
58 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE FED. CTS., 2006 ANN. REP. Table B-8, available
www.cafc. uscourts.gov/pdf/b08sep06.pdf.
59 See Pegram, supra note 27, at 771-72.
60 See id.
61 See id.
62 See id.
63 See id.
50

at
at
at
at
at
at
at
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satisfied applicant for a patent may, after exhausting appropriate appeals with the USPTO, file a civil action against the USPTO Director,
64
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
The number of appeals from the USPTO account for a small percentage (typically less than 5%) of the appeals heard by the CAFC.65
66
The reversal rate for the USPTO is similarly low.
3. U.S. International Trade Commission (“ITC”)
The ITC was created by Congress as an independent agency “to
administer laws regulating trade with the United States.”67 Of particular interest to the patent system is the ITC’s authority under section
337 of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act to bar importation of goods infringing U.S. patents.68 The imported goods may directly infringe a
U.S. patent or may be made by a process that infringes a U.S. patent.69
However, there must be an industry in the United States relating to
70
the imported goods. For example, in the telecommunications industry, plaintiffs bring their cases before the ITC under Section 337 of the
71
Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act. The ITC attempts to clear these cases in
under a year, and can issue import bans on products infringing U.S.
patent law.72
Plaintiff patent owners find the ITC attractive despite the fact
73
that it has no authority to award damages for infringement. First,
there are no geographic or personal jurisdictional limits if the patents
74
are infringed by foreign imports. Second, “the ITC’s exclusion or75
ders are in rem.” Most important to patent owners, however, is the
rapidity of the ITC’s granting of relief: the typical case is resolved in
one year “or, at the most, ‘in more complicated’ cases, within eighteen
months.”76 However, seeking injunctive relief through the ITC does
not necessarily lighten the District Court workload; because damages

64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

See 35 U.S.C. § 145.
See supra Table 1.
Id.
Pegram, supra note 27, at 772.
See id. at 772-73.
See id.
See id.
Smoot-Hawley’s Revenge, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2006, at A10.
See Pegram, supra note 27, at 771-72.
See id. at 772.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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can only be awarded by a court, many patentees pursue a dual litiga77
tion track for damages in the federal courts.
The appeals from the ITC account for a fraction of the caseload
78
The reversal rate for ITC decisions are typically
of the CAFC.
much lower than those heard from the district courts.79
4. U.S. District Courts
Just as the complexity of technology has grown, so has the complexity of the court systems. For example, in 1800 there were only 17
district court judges, and 6 Supreme Court justices, who also doubled
as the Circuit Court of Appeals.80 Today, there are over 90 United
States district courts, having “exclusive, original jurisdiction ‘of any
81
civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents.’”
Serving in these district courts are over 600 United States district
82
judges and over 270 senior judges. In addition to those Article III
judges, each district has one or more magistrate judges, who are appointed for a renewable fixed term and whose powers are more lim83
ited.
By statute, the district courts must notify the USPTO of the
commencement and the disposition of patent suits filed pursuant to
U.S.C. Title 35.84 Aside from this requirement, several district courts,
notably the Eastern District of Texas and the Northern District of
California have augmented their local rules with patent specific pro85
cedures.
B. Trends in the Patent System
The rate of patent filing doubled during the 1990s.86 USPTO filing projections presented in the Subcommittee Hearing testimony in
October 2005 painted a dire picture: annual patent filings between
2000 and 2010 were predicted to grow at only a slightly slower rate
77

See Steve Seidenberg, Patent Rocket Docket, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2007, at 38.
See supra Table 1.
79 See note infra Table 3.
80 See Pegram, supra note 27, at 767-68.
81 Id. at 768 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1331)).
82 See id. at 769.
83 Id.
84 See 35 U.S.C. § 290.
85 See Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice
Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 900 (2001).
86 See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy from Empirical Research on Patent Litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 24 (2005).
78

FIU Law Review

298

[4:287

87

than in the 1990s. In 2000, the USPTO granted about 180,000 patents.88 If the number of patents issued nearly doubled as well, by
2010, the potential sources of patent litigation could be overwhelming.
Fortunately, however, the total numbers of patents granted since 2000
has remained relatively steady, and even declined somewhat, as reflected in
Table 2. Total Patent Filings 2000-2005.
Table 2. Total Patent Filings 2000-2005.
89

90

91

92

93

94

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

176,087

184,057

184,428

187,054

181,322

157,740

Even if a patent tsunami has not materialized, however, patent
litigation has surged. In 2000, the USPTO granted about 180,000 pat95
ents, which resulted in around 2,000 patent cases. By September 30,

87 See SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 3, at 48 (statement of Chris J. Katopis, Table II —
USPTO Workload Projections).
88 See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 86, at 2-3.
89 See
PATENT TECHNOLOGY MONITORING BRANCH (PTMB), ELECTRONIC
INFORMATION PRODUCTS DIVISION, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENTING
TRENDS CALENDAR YEAR 2000, available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/
oeip/taf/pat_tr00.htm
90 See
PATENT TECHNOLOGY MONITORING BRANCH (PTMB), ELECTRONIC
INFORMATION PRODUCTS DIVISION, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENTING
TRENDS CALENDAR YEAR 2001, available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/
ac/ido/oeip/taf/pat_tr01.html.
91 See
PATENT TECHNOLOGY MONITORING BRANCH (PTMB), ELECTRONIC
INFORMATION PRODUCTS DIVISION, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENTING
TRENDS CALENDAR YEAR 2002 (document dated 04-FEB-2003), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/pat_tr02.html.
92 See
PATENT TECHNOLOGY MONITORING BRANCH (PTMB), ELECTRONIC
INFORMATION PRODUCTS DIVISION, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENTING
TRENDS CALENDAR YEAR 2003 (document dated 04-Mar-2004), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/pat_tr03.html.
93 See
PATENT TECHNOLOGY MONITORING BRANCH (PTMB), ELECTRONIC
INFORMATION PRODUCTS DIVISION, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENTING
TRENDS CALENDAR YEAR 2004 (document dated 09-FEB-2005), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/pat_tr04.html.
94 See
PATENT TECHNOLOGY MONITORING BRANCH (PTMB), ELECTRONIC
INFORMATION PRODUCTS DIVISION, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENTING
TRENDS CALENDAR YEAR 2005 (document dated 08-FEB-2006), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/
ac/ido/oeip/taf/pat_tr05.html.
95 See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 86, at 2.
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96

2004, 3,075 new patent cases were filed in district courts, a 50% increase in four years. The recent trend toward seeking speedy injunctive relief from the ITC is threatened by the increasing patent litigation workload.97 “Fiscal year 2006 set a new high for the agency’s IP
work. It launched a record 40 section 337 proceedings between Oct.
1, 2005, and Sept. 30, 2006. This was up 38 percent from fiscal year
2005, and up a whopping 250 percent from four years ago.”98 In June,
the Intellectual Property Law Section passed a resolution asking the
99
ITC to add a third courtroom and a fifth administrative law judge.
100
Damage awards are soaring. Jury awards in particular have reached
the billion-dollar range since 1982.101 “[B]etween 1982 and 1992, the
102
damages ranged between $873 million and $19.8 million.” In one
case, Exxon Chemical Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., the district trial
court awarded $48 million in damages, which was doubled for willfulness, and $8.7 million in interest, plus $23.7 million in attorney’s
fees–the award totaling over a staggering $130 million.103 On appeal,
this award was reversed rather than remanded.104 As a result, the con105
sequences of a district judge’s incorrect claim construction can be
quite severe.106
96 See SUBCOMM REPORT, supra note 3, at 16 (statement of John B. Pegram citing Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Business of the United States Courts-2004., Table C2A, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2004/appendices/c2a.pdf).
97 See Seidenberg, supra note 77.
98 Id.
99 See id.
100 See Moore, supra note 49, at 11-12.
101 See Ted D. Lee & Michelle Evans, The Charade: Trying a Patent Case to All “Three”
Juries, 8 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 9 (1999).
102 See id.
103 See Moore, supra note 100, at 11-12.
104 See id. at 12.
105 See Michael C. Smith, Rocket Docket: Marshall Court Leads Nation in Hearing Patent
Cases, 69 TEX. B. J. 1045 (2006). On the issue of “Claims construction,” Smith says:
“Claims construction” often requires a brief explanation. One of the aspects of patent cases
that is unusual–what, in fact, requires the special rules for the initial stages–is the 1995 decision by the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, which is the appellate court to which all patent
cases are appealed, that the determination of what the terms in a patent mean is a legal issue,
not a factual one. Consequently, judges, not juries, must decide what the words in a patent
mean.
As noted, patents are essentially deeds to an idea, and the initial question, “What does this
patent cover?” requires an analysis of what the patent means and covers–not unlike a survey of
a piece of land. Judges now do this during “claims construction” or Markman hearings by construing what the terms in the patent claims mean and, accordingly, what the patent covers.
Essentially, they determine whether a word in the patent means what the plaintiff argues it does,
what the defendant argues, or something entirely different.
But the mortality rate of judges’ claims construction rulings in patent cases, which are reviewed under the de novo standard, is extraordinarily high on appeal, with the Federal Circuit
reversing at least part of the judge's ruling approximately 40 percent of the time. But not in
Marshall. Despite handling more than 200 patent cases between them at a time, Judges Ward
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107

Complexity is increasing. Two hundred years ago, patent law
was not particularly complex.108 Travel and communication was exceedingly difficult, possibly a reason for so few litigations–one had to
109
know about an infringement for there to be a dispute. In contrast,
110
by 1999, over 2,318 patent litigation cases were filed.
When the few cases were litigated, the technology was likely to
111
be understood by “farmer-jurors.” Today, the complexity of technology has increased to the point where patent cases consume 9.4% of
the time for all civil cases, while only accounting for .57% of the
caseload.112
Many attribute the increased costs, inconsistencies, and forum
shopping to two factors: the relatively high rate of reversals of district
court patent decisions, and the relatively long time to resolve patent
cases in the district courts.113
1. Wide Variation in Resolution Times by District Courts
One of the purposes of the creation of the CAFC was to improve
the uniformity in patent law and decisions, because of “notorious difference[s]” between the PTO and the courts.114 Forum shopping was
rampant because of significant divergences among the regional courts
115
of appeal. Although most would agree that the CAFC largely has
met this goal, the problem of forum shopping in patent cases continues to be widespread today at the trial court level.116 Empirical studies
show that patent cases are not dispersed evenly throughout the dis117
trict courts, but tend to be consolidated in a few select jurisdictions.

and Davis have never been reversed by the Federal Circuit–the closest either has come was a
revision of one claim term in one order by Judge Ward. This startling fact underscores the expertise that the local judges have developed in these complex cases. For better or worse, when
the judge hands down his construction of the terms in the patent, thus setting the metes and
bounds of the plaintiff's invention, the ruling is–at least thus far–virtually bulletproof on appeal.
Id. at 1048.
106 See Moore, supra note 100, at 11-12.
107 See Pegram, supra note 27, at 767.
108 See id.
109 See id.
110 See id.
111 See id.
112 See Moore, supra note 85, 933.
113 See SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 3, at 2.
114 See id. at 15 (statement of John B. Pegram, Senior Counsel, New York Office, Fish &
Richardson, P.C.).
115 See id.
116 See Moore, supra note 112, at 889-90, 903.
117 See id. at 889, 892, 903.
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Patent cases are prone to forum shopping for several reasons.
Because of the increasingly global nature of commerce, and liberalization of jurisdiction and venue statutes, particularly for corporate defendants, a patent plaintiff’s choice of district courts is widely ex118
panded and expedites forum shopping. There is a wide variation in
119
the time district courts take to resolve patent cases. The relatively
long time to resolve patent cases by itself would directly impact litigation costs.120 Because there is a wide variation among the district
courts in the times to dispose of cases, plaintiffs seeking relief search
121
out the quickest patent courts, known as “rocket dockets.” An example of the legal gyrations that plaintiffs perform to get within the
jurisdiction of one of the rocket dockets involved one plaintiff’s paralegal ordering a device made in Florida, and shipping it to Virginia.122
Three of the five fastest districts for resolution are “in the ‘top
123
twenty’ in terms of number of patent cases.” None of the five slowest districts are in the top twenty districts in terms of patent litigation.124 Because of these differences, many litigants are “voting with
their feet;” relief in some patent cases is being sought outside the judi125
ciary.
2. High Reversal Rate of District Court Decisions
A high reversal rate is an indicator of confusion among the lower
courts.126 A study of every patent case that went to trial between 1983
and 1999 shows that the high reversal rate was primarily in the area of
127
The reversal rate for validity claims was 22%,
claim construction.
for infringement claims was 20%, for enforceability was 24%, and for
128
willfulness was 15%.
Data for the years 2000-2006 show the number of appeals filed
and reversed by the CAFC from the District Courts. See Table 3 below.
118

See id. at 892-95.
See id. at 908-09.
120 See O’Malley, supra note 13, at 681.
121 See Moore, supra note 85, at 900 n.47.
122 See T.S. Ellis, III, Quicker and Less Expensive Patent Enforcement of Patents in the
United States Courts, CASRIP PUBLICATION SERIES NO. 5: STREAMLINING INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1999, at 14.
123 Moore, supra note 85, at 909.
124 See id. at 909.
125 See Smoot-Hawley’s Revenge, supra note 71.
126 See Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictible?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 231 (2005).
127 See Moore, supra note 42, at 13-15.
128 See id. at 14.
119
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Table 3. Reversal Rates by the CAFC 2000-2006
Reversal Rates
USPTO
ITC
U.S. District Courts

129

2000

130

2001

131

2002

132

2003

133

2004

134

2005

135

2006

17%

12%

20%

7%

3%

9%

3%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

17%

40%

16%

23%

23%

11%

13%

13%

13%

Different authorities cite varying figures for the number of reversals of district court decisions by the CAFC. The reversal rate for the
136
district courts by the CAFC is approximately 35%. Another scholar
finds the reversal rates are 33% because district court judges improperly construed patent claim terms.137 Yet another study shows that
reversal of claim construction decisions in the last six months of 2003
138
is running about seventy-one percent. For example, over the year
2003, the reversal rate has been 58%, while other more conservative
139
During the 10 years since the Suestimates place it around 47%.
preme Court’s decision in Markman,140 the reversal rate has steadily
increased.141 Whether the actual reversal rate is a staggering 71% for
a six-month period or 33%, the average reversal rate in other circuits
142
is about 17% to 20% .
The high reversal rate has an impact on litigation strategy and the
courts in three ways: 1) Patent litigation is far too expensive; 2) parties
go through legal “gyrations” to get the case to appeal to avoid a whole

129

See supra note 52.
See supra note 53.
131 See supra note 54.
132 See supra note 55.
133 See supra note 56.
134 See supra note 57.
135 See supra note 58.
136 See SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 3, at 7 (statement of Prof. Kimberly A. Moore).
137 See Moore, supra note 42, at 1-3.
138 Kathleen M. O’Malley, Patti Saris & Ronald H. White, A Panel Discussion: Claim Construction from the Perspective of the District Judge, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 671, 690 n.31
(2004).
139 Id.
140 See generally Markman v. Westview Instr., Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
141 Improving Federal Court Adjudication of Patent Cases: Hearing before the H. Subcomm.
on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 21
(2005) (statement of Prof. Kimberly A. Moore); Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years
Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictables?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 245-247 (2005).
142 Kathleen M. O’Malley, Patti Saris, & Ronald H. White, A Panel Discussion: Claim
Construction from the Perspective of the District Judge, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 671, 679 (2004).
130
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trial, only to have claim construction reversed; and 3) district court
143
judges, to some degree, are demoralized.
One study notes that an average patent infringement suit in Cali144
fornia will cost each party over two million in litigation expenses.
Run of the mill cases cost $1.2 million to $10 million to get through
145
Markman.
However, another empirical study shows that the results for expenditures in patent cases are not excessively high.146 This study measured cost as a function of the length of time to termination, number of
documents filed in court, and whether cases reach the stage of filing for
a summary judgment.147 Overall, another study found that the litigation
148
costs and settlement costs, though similar, were relatively modest.
For example, slightly over 40% of all patent cases remained unresolved
after 360 days; less than 10% were unresolved after 1080 days.149
The backlog of unresolved pending appeals from the District
Courts in the CAFC has remained fairly constant over the last six
years. See Table 4. The backlog of appeals pending in the CAFC
from the District Courts at the end of each year is typically the highest
of any other category. Although fairly constant, however, these cases
150
amount to almost 1/3 of annually pending cases.

143

Id. at 681.
Report of Economic Survey, AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N 72 (1999).
145 O’Malley et al., supra note 142, at 681.
146 Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical
Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237,
281-82 (2006).
147 Id. at 257-58.
148 Id. at 281-82.
149 Id. at 283 fig.2b.
150 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE FED. CTS., 2006 ANN. REP., at tbl.B-8, available at
http://www.fedcir.gov/pdf/asooct2005.pdf.
144

FIU Law Review

304

[4:287

Table 4. CAFC Annual Backlog of Pending Patent Cases.
151

2000
Total Pending End
of Year

422

152

2001

350

153

2002

154

2003

408

408

155

2004

364

156

2005

376

157

2006

402

3. District Court Judges are Demoralized
Some scholars claim that the 33% error rate creates doubt about
the abilities of district court judges to decide complex technical patent
cases.158 This has led at least one district court judge to joke that: “the
easiest thing to do is figure out what your decision is and write the
opposite.159” Another judge asks: “Are we district judges just stu160
pid?”
Judge Samuel B. Kent eloquently sums up his feelings:
Frankly, I don’t know why I’m so excited about trying to bring
this thing [patent suit] to closure. It goes to the Federal Circuit
afterwards. You know, it’s hard to deal with things that are ultimately resolved by people wearing propeller hats. But we’ll just
have to see what happens when we give it to them. I could say
that with impunity because they’ve reversed everything I’ve ever
done, so I expect fully they’ll reverse this, too.161
Yet another judge points to the relative infrequency of patent
cases, inflexible case assignment procedures, time consuming nature
of patent cases and even shifts some of the blame to a lack of feedback from the CAFC:

151 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE FED. CTS., 2000 ANN. REP., at 119 tbl.B-8, available at
www.fedcir.gov/pdf/b08sep00.pdf..
152 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE FED. CTS., 2001 ANN. REP., at 115 tbl.B-8, available at
www.fedcir.gov/pdf/b08sep01.pdf.
153 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE FED. CTS., 2002 ANN. REP., at 114 tbl.B-8, available at
www.fedcir.gov/pdf/b08sep02.pdf.
154 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE FED. CTS., 2003 ANN. REP., at tbl.B-8, available at
www.fedcir.gov/pdf/b08sep03.pdf.
155 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE FED. CTS., 2004 ANN. REP., at tbl.B-8, available at
http://www.fedcir.gov/pdf/aosep04.pdf.
156 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE FED. CTS., 2005 ANN. REP., at tbl.B-8, available at
http://www.fedcir.gov/pdf/asooct2005.pdf.
157 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE FED. CTS., 2006 ANN. REP., at tbl.B-8, available at
http://www.fedcir.gov/pdf/asooct2005.pdf.
158 Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 12
FED. CIR. B.J. 1, 2 (2002).
159 O’Malley et al., supra note 142, at 682-83.
160 Id. at 682.
161 Moore, supra note 158, at 9.
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My duties as a U.S. District judge require that I be a generalist. . . .
Only senior judges . . . can turn away cases which are otherwise
randomly assigned to them. I cannot, except in the rare instance
of recusal.
...
[O]nly when a patent case comes our way do we brush up on the
latest developments in patent laws. We do not as a matter of
course receive the opinions issued by the United States Courts of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit in chambers as we U.S. District
Judges do the Opinion of our respective regional federal appel162
late courts.
C. H.R. 5418
The major rationale behind H.R. 5418 is that “the district court
judges have too little exposure to develop the skills necessary for efficient conduct of such litigation.”163 One of the claims is that federal
district court judges have not developed expertise in patent cases, especially claim construction, because, on average, they have only one
164
patent trial every 6 to 8 years. In the district court system, there are
nearly 680 active district court judges and another 290 senior judges
that currently hear around 3% of the approximately 3000 patent cases
165
filed each year. For example, in FY 2004, this meant that the average district court judge received only 4-5 new patent cases each year,
amounting to only around 1% of their caseload.166 Even in one of the
historically busiest district courts for patents, the U.S. District Court
in Chicago, one judge reported that his patent case workload never
exceed five percent.167

162 Improving Federal Court Adjudication of Patent Cases: Hearing before the H. Subcomm.
on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005) (statement of John B. Pegram, Senior Counsel, New York Office, Fish & Richardson,
P.C) (quoting Judge Holderman).
163 Id.
164 John B. Pegram, Should There Be a U.S. Trial Court with a Specialization in Patent Litigation?, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 765, 770 (2000).
165 Improving Federal Court Adjudication of Patent Cases: Hearing before the H. Subcomm.
on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 20
(2005) (statement of Prof. Kimberly A. Moore).
166 Improving Federal Court Adjudication of Patent Cases: Hearing before the H. Subcomm.
on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 5
(2005) (statement of John B. Pegram, Senior Counsel, New York Office, Fish & Richardson,
P.C.).
167 H.R. Rep. No. 109-673, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/T?&
report=hr673&dbname=109&.
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The American Bar Association Section of Intellectual Property
passed a resolution supporting in principle a pilot program of the type
168
contemplated in H.R. 5418. A number of other patent related trade
associations, which include AIPLA, IPO, BSA, CEA, ACT, BIO, and
PhRMA have expressed support for the enactment of the pilot pro169
gram.
The opposition cited a lack of evidence of a problem with district
court patent cases, and no evidence that H.R. 5418 would solve a purported problem.170 The supporters said that empirical studies show a
problem and that “foreign countries have benefited from setting up
specialized courts to handle patents.”171
H.R. 5418 was introduced into the 109th Congress on March 26,
2006, passed in the House, and referred to the Senate on September
29, 2006. On November 13, 2006, the bill was referred to the Commit172
tee on the Judiciary.
1. Proposed Case Assignment System
Section 137 of 28 U.S.C.A provides that the local rules and order
of the district court will govern the division of business, including case
assignments, among the district judges.173 The chief judge of the district court is responsible for the enforcement and observance of the
174
case assignments according to these local rules. If the district judges
in any district are unable to agree upon the adoption of rules or orders
for that purpose the judicial council of the circuit shall make the necessary orders.175

168 ABA
Comm. on Intell. Prop., Resolution 601-8 (2000), available at
http://www.abanet.org/intelprop/jun00chair.html. The Resolution was approved to establish a
pilot program to encourage enhancement of expertise in patent cases among patent judges or
similar legislation. The Resolution supports, in principle, the implementation of a pilot program
to determine whether the consolidation of patent cases among designated judges in whose districts such cases are filed improves the litigation of patent cases; and, SPECIFICALLY, the
Section supports, in principle, a pilot program of the type contemplated by H.R. 5418 (109th
Congress, 1st Sess.) (2005) (Issa).
169 H.R. Rep. No. 109-673, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/T?&
report=hr673&dbname=109&.
170 ABA IP Law Section on Pilot Program For Trying Patent Cases, Resolution 72 PTCJ
235 (2006).
171 Id.
172 http://thomas.loc.gov/home/c109bills.html (follow [5400 - 5500] hyperlink; then follow
[H.R.5418.RFS] hyperlink; then follow [Bill Summary & Status] hyperlink; then follow [All
Information] hyperlink).
173 28 U.S.C. § 137.
174 Id.
175 Id.
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Case assignment may be prescribed by local court rules per 28
176
U.S.C.A. § 137 or by general order. One system that many courts
177
use is the blind assignment of cases to particular judges. Under such
an assignment plan, a party does not learn which judge will hear the
case until after the case is filed, and the clerk has no discretion in as178
signing cases. A general order providing for the assignment of cases
which have been identified by the chief judge as protracted, difficult,
or widely publicized was within the power granted by 28 USCA § 137
to control the assignment of cases so as to facilitate the business of the
court.179 Similarly, district judges may by rule, order, or consent transfer cases between themselves for the expeditious administration of
180
justice.
The Pilot Program proposes a case assignment system in which
district judges may request that the chief judge of the court designate
them to hear patent or plant variety cases.181 Initially, a patent or plant
variety case is randomly assigned to any of the judges in that district
court.182 However, if a judge who has not been designated as a patent
183
judge is assigned to a case, that judge may decline to accept the case.
A case so declined is then randomly assigned to one of the designated
patent judges.184 Senior judges can be designated as patent judges;
however, there must be at least one active judge designated as a pat185
ent judge. The local rules of transferring and reassigning cases are
not affected by the rules of the H.R. 5418 pilot program.186
2. Criteria for Pilot Courts
At least five courts will be chosen for the Pilot Program by the
Administrative Office of the United State Courts in at least 3 different
judicial circuits.187 These courts will be chosen from among the top 15
district courts in which the largest number of patent and plant variety
188
The
protection cases was filed in the most recent calendar year.
176

United States v. Keane, 375 F. Supp. 1201, 1204-05 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
J. Robert Brown, Jr. & Allison Herren Lee, Neutral Assignment of Judges at the Court of
Appeals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1037, 1075 tbl.1 (2000).
178 Id. at 1075.
179 Keane, 375 F. Supp. at 1204-05.
180 Id.
181 H.R. 5418 § (1) (a) (1) (A).
182 H.R. 5418 § (1) (a) (1) (B).
183 H.R. 5418 § (1) (a) (1) (C).
184 H.R. 5418 § (1) (a) (1) (D).
185 H.R. 5418 § (1) (a) (2).
186 H.R. 5418 § (1) (a) (3).
187 .R. 5418 § (1) (b).
188 Id.
177
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court must also have at least 10 district judges, of which at least
three have requested to be designated as patent judges.190 The most
recent incarnation of H.R. 5418, H.R. 628, was amended to include
courts that have adopted local patent rules.
3. Metrics
The success of the ten-year pilot program will be measured on a
number of factors191–which include:
(A) an analysis of the extent to which the program has succeeded
in developing expertise in patent and plant variety protection
cases among the district judges of the district courts so designated;
(B) an analysis of the extent to which the program has improved
the efficiency of the courts involved by reason of such expertise;
(C) with respect to patent cases handled by the judges designated
pursuant to subsection (a)(1)(A) and judges not so designated, a
comparison between the 2 groups of judges with respect to–
(i) the rate of reversal by the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, of such cases on the issues of claim construction and substantive patent law; and
(ii) the period of time elapsed from the date on which a case is
filed to the date on which trial begins or summary judgment is
entered;192
Two key measurements are made: 1) the rate of reversal by the
CAFC of patent cases on issues of claim construction and substantive
patent law; and 2) the period of time elapse from the date on which a
case is filed to the date on which trail begins or summary judgment is
entered.193
III. COMMENTARY
A. Case Assignment and Reversal Rates in Selected Courts
This analysis looks at the case assignment profile for five district
courts. The case assignment system proposed by H.R. 5418 should
189
190
191
192
193

H.R. 5418 § (1) (b) (1).
H.R. 5418 § (1) (b) (2).
H.R. 5418 § (1) (e).
Id.
Id.
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produce a non-random assignment of patent cases to designated
judges. If the distribution of cases to district judges is totally random,
one would expect to see roughly the same percentage of patent cases
heard by each district judge. If a court’s assignment profile was nonrandom, then the actual procedures would simulate the procedures
proposed by H.R. 5418, and might shed light on H.R. 5418’s impact.
The district courts were chosen for this study based on the volume of patent litigation for the period between 1995-1999. Although
the Eastern District of Virginia technically will not qualify for the pi194
lot program because there are fewer than 10 judges, it was included
because of its patent rocket-docket reputation, its ranking as number
195
eight in patent volume, and because its Chief Judge, T.S. Ellis, III,
testified at the H.R. 5418 congressional hearings as an expert in patent
litigation.196 In addition, the Eastern District of Texas has gained recent popularity as a patent rocket docket and was included for that
197
See Table 5. The statistics are examined for each court
reason.
separately, due to the varying number of judges in each court.
198

Table 5. Data for District Courts Chosen For Study
Rank

Court

Number

% of Total

1

Central District of California

870

9.1

2

Northern District of California

606

6.3

3

Northern District of Illinois

569

5.9

8

Eastern District of Virginia

288

3.0

-

Eastern District of Texas

-

-

194 See C. Erik Hawes & James Beebe, H.R. 5418 and Specialized “Patent Courts”: The
Latest Congressional Effort at Patent Reform, 25 A.B.A. SEC. INTELL. PROP. L., at 18 (2007).
195 See Moore, supra note 85, at 902-03.
196 See Improving Federal Court Adjudication of Patent Cases: Hearing on H.R. 5418 Before
the H. Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 69 (2005) (statement of T.S. Ellis, III, Chief Justice, Eastern District of Virginia).
197 See C. Erik Hawes & James Beebe, Is Texas at Risk of Being Excluded from Latest
Congressional Patent Reform Effort?, ST. B. TEX. SEC. INTELL. PROP. L., Winter 2007, at 6,
available at http://www.texasbariplaw.org/newsletters.htm (click on “Winter 2007”).
198 Moore, supra note 111, at 902-03 (showing no data for the Eastern District of Texas in
this study).
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1. The Data
The data for these courts were obtained from Westlaw profilerWLD199 database for each district court judge. The list of judges for
each court was obtained from the home page of the district court.200
All judges listed–active, magistrate, and senior judges–were included. H.R. 5418 allows senior judges to be designated if at least one
active judge is also designated.201 Magistrate judges are not included
because, under H.R. 5418 §1(b) (1), the judges must be appointed by
the President under 28 U.S.C. 133(a), or “on a temporary basis under
other provisions of law.”202
For each judge, a Document-List query was run for the period
between January 1, 2001, and December 31, 2006. The DocumentList query returned all cases on that judge’s docket for that period.
This included judicial opinions as well as court orders. A search filter
allowed queries to distinguish between judicial opinions and docket
items.
Most importantly, administrative office of the District Court’s determination classifies each item in the document list by the “Nature of
the Suit.” 203 The Nature of the Suit field is listed in Westlaw as the
204
Primary Case Type. Therefore here, the primary case type of “In199 This database, available through Westlaw, contains profiles of attorneys and judges, and
contains more than 1,000,000 profiles of law firms, offices, and lawyers from all 50 states, Puerto
Rico, the Virgin Islands, the District of Columbia, Canada, England, and Europe. The profiles
are linked to cases and documents, starting in 1990.
200 See http://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/ (click on “Judges Procedures and Schedules);
http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/ (click on “Judges”); http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/ (click on
“Judges”); http://www.vaed.uscourts.gov/locations/ale.htm#telephone; http://www.ilnd.uscourts.
gov/home/Judges.
aspx.
201 H.R. 5418 § 1(a) (2).
202 H.R. 5418 § 1(b) (1).
203 Studies have found that only 5% of all cases listed by the Patent Trade Office were not
included as patent cases in the Administrative Office’s data, indicating that the AO data is relatively complete. See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How are Patent Cases Resolved?
An Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L.
REV. 237, 250 n.84 (2006).
204 Instant Message Conversation with Patrick Y., Westlaw Technical Support (2008) (on
file with author). Relevant portions of the conversation are as follows:
.
.
.
You Say: Does Westlaw use the Nature of Suit field from the original case
data?
.
.
.
Patrick Y. Says: OK--I know what you mean. Yes–these Primary Case Type
designations come from the Nature of Suit field as found in our Dockets
You Say: What is the original source data for your docket information?
Patrick Y. Says: The courts themselves--our dockets are linked directly
to the court’s docket system. . . .
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tellectual Property — Patents” was used–this excluded copyright and
trademark cases.
By combining the filters for judicial opinions and primary case
type, the list of all patent opinions for each judge for the specified
time period was returned. Each opinion was annotated with the
Westlaw symbols for history, including whether the case had been
overturned on a point of law. The reversal rate was determined from
205
this indicator by a manual count. The raw numbers for each judge
were generated by case type, expanded, sorted, and exported into Microsoft Excel™, where the following percentages were calculated:
Patents as Percentage of Docket: the number of docketed patent
items to total docket, including judicial opinions;
Patents as Percentage of Judicial Opinions: the number of patent
judicial opinions to total judicial opinions;
Patent Reversal Rate: the number of patent judicial opinions that
were overturned on at least one point of law compared to the
number of patent judicial opinions.
Overall Reversal Rate: the total number of patent cases reversed
compared to the total number of patent cases.
Note that the patent reversal rate includes all reversals, not just
reversals in the narrow area of claim construction. As a result, reversal rates may appear lower than in that smaller subset. However, because the hypothesis being tested is that the more experience a district
judge has in patent law, the lower the reversal rate, procedural reversals would be expected to decline as well as reversals due to claim
construction. Consequently, reversals of all types were included, regardless of type or number of claims.
2. The Eastern District of Texas: Divisional Assignment
In the most recently favored stop for patent litigation, the Eastern District of Texas, cases are assigned randomly, but each judge is
assigned a fixed percentage of cases from each division. The Chief
Judge, exercising this power pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 137, periodically
issues General Orders modifying the percentages as needed by shifting workloads, recusals, new appointments, and retirements. For example, the caseload for one active Article III judge might get 35% of
all civil cases from a particular district, 100% of the criminal cases

205 Because of the small number of patent decisions, as opposed to docketed items, the
manual count was straightforward, but still prone to transcription error.
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206

from another district. The workloads for magistrate judges are similarly designated.207
In practice, the total statistics of caseload for 2001-2006 show a
wide variation in the percentage of patent cases in the judges’ workload. A sampling of data for the Eastern District of Texas (the coun208
try’s latest patent rocket docket ) shows some surprising results.
Rather than an even distribution, two district judges account for
around 18% of all patent cases heard. See Table 6.
Table 6. Eastern District of Texas Case Workload
Patents as % of Docket
ED TX
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Overall, decisions of the judges in the Eastern District of Texas
were seldom reversed as seen in Figure 2. Surprisingly, for this period
only one judge showed a non-zero reversal rate of about 25%. The
top jurists had no reversals. However, no strong correlation seems to
exist between the number of patent cases heard and the reversal rate;
all but one of the judges who only had 3% or less of their docket filled
with patent cases, had no reversals.

206 E.D. TEX. GEN. ORD. No. 06-13, available at http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/
Rules/GeneralOrders/2006/GO-06-13.pdf.
207 E.D. TEX. GEN. ORD. No. 04-23, available at http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/Rules/
GeneralOrders/2004/go04-23.pdf.
208 Michael C. Smith, Three more news stories on ED patent docket, EASTERN DISTRICT OF
TEXAS FEDERAL COURT PRACTICE, Oct. 5, 2006, http://mcsmith.blogs.com/eastern_district_of_
texas/2006/10/three_more_news.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2006).
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Figure 2. ED TX Patent Reversals to Docket
Patent Reversal Rate to Patents on Docket
ED TX
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Conclusion: The Eastern District of Texas case assignment practice is similar to the one proposed by H.R. 5418. No strong correlation is seen between the practice with patent cases and lower reversal
rates.
3. Northern District of California: Ballot System
The Northern District of California’s case assignment system is
designed to be proportionate, random, and blind.209 A ballot system is
210
The clerk of the
used, which can be either manual or automated.
court assigns cases to judges who have chambers in the courthouse in
which the action arises.211 One ballot per judge is placed in a given
212
case category. Newly filed cases are assigned to one of seventeen
categories.213 Within each category, the assignments should result in
an approximately equal distribution of newly filed civil cases within

209 N.D. CAL. GEN. ORD. No. 44 § (D) (2) (a), available at http://www.cand.uscourts.
gov/CAND/LocalRul.nsf/10ffec4f66aa15db88256d4f005bb710/4ea42a44f165eac488256d4f005bc7
81?OpenDocument.
210 N.D. CAL. GEN. ORD. No. 44 § (D) (2) (b), available at http://www.cand.uscourts.
gov/CAND/LocalRul.nsf/10ffec4f66aa15db88256d4f005bb710/4ea42a44f165eac488256d4f005bc7
81?OpenDocument.
211 N.D. CAL. GEN. ORD. No. 44 § (D) (1), available at http://www.cand.uscourts.
gov/CAND/LocalRul.nsf/10ffec4f66aa15db88256d4f005bb710/4ea42a44f165eac488256d4f005bc7
81?OpenDocument.
212 N.D. CAL. GEN. ORD. No. 44 § (D) (2) (b), available at http://www.cand.uscourts.
gov/CAND/LocalRul.nsf/10ffec4f66aa15db88256d4f005bb710/4ea42a44f165eac488256d4f005bc7
81?OpenDocument.
213 Id.

FIU Law Review

314

[4:287

214

each of the categories. Patent cases are assigned to the Intellectual
Property category, which also includes trademark and copyright
215
cases.
A separate system of assignment is maintained for intellectual
property cases.216 The system is still random, but venue can be in any
courthouse in the district, not just the courthouse in which the case is
217
filed initially. Thus, patents cases are randomly assigned to any of
the judges in the district, thereby eliminating an opportunity for judge
shopping.
Reassignment of cases in the Northern District is generally done
for the usual reasons, including an intra-district reassignment of cases
due to volume.218 However, intellectual property cases are excepted
from this rule and cannot be reassigned to load balance.219 Like any
other cases, except for a capital habeas corpus case, an intellectual
220
Reassigning a
property case may be reassigned between judges.
case between judges required written orders by the transferring judge
and the accepting judge, and does not require any additional ap221
proval. Under such a system, a judge who does not want to hear a
patent cases could transfer to a willing patent judge.

214

Id.
N.D. CAL. GEN. ORD. No. 44 § (D) (5), available at http://www.cand.uscourts.
gov/CAND/LocalRul.nsf/10ffec4f66aa15db88256d4f005bb710/4ea42a44f165eac488256d4f005bc7
81?OpenDocument.
216 Id. Other categories of cases that have separate assignment plans include Prisoner Petitions, Securities Class Actions, and Capital Habeas Corpus cases. Id.
217 Id.
218 N.D. CAL. GEN. ORD. No. 44 § (E), available at http://www.cand.uscourts.
gov/CAND/LocalRul.nsf/10ffec4f66aa15db88256d4f005bb710/4ea42a44f165eac488256d4f005bc7
81?OpenDocument.
219 N.D. CAL. GEN. ORD. No. 44 § (D) (5) (2), available at http://www.cand.uscourts.
gov/CAND/LocalRul.nsf/10ffec4f66aa15db88256d4f005bb710/4ea42a44f165eac488256d4f005bc7
81?OpenDocument.
220 N.D. CAL. GEN. ORD. No. 44 § (E) (4), available at http://www.cand.uscourts.
gov/CAND/LocalRul.nsf/10ffec4f66aa15db88256d4f005bb710/4ea42a44f165eac488256d4f005bc7
81?OpenDocument.
221 Id.
215
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Table 7. Northern District of California
Patents as % of Docket
ND CA

6.00%
5.00%
4.00%
3.00%
2.00%
1.00%
0.00%
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

Figure 3. ND CA Patent Reversals to Docket

Patent Reversal Rate to % of Patents on Docket
ND CA
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4. Central District of California: Automated Case Assignment
System
The Central District of California has a random assignment system known as the Automated Case Assignment System (ACAS) or
222
Assignment Wheel. The system is designed to have an equal num223
ber of cases assigned to each judge over a period of time. After filing and numbering a case, the Clerk used the ACAS system to ran-

222
223

C.D. CAL. GEN. ORD. NO. 05-06 § 21.2.
Id.
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domly obtain the name of the judge to whom the case will be assigned.224
The case stays with the judge to whom the cases is assigned until
225
terminated or transferred. A case can be transferred by an order
jointly signed by the transferor and transferee judges.226 If such a
transfer is made it shall be debited and credited against the transferor
227
A self-recusing
and transferee judges, respectively, in the ACAS.
judge may appeal the transfer as not being “a case of equal or similar
weight and complexity.”228
The case assignment statistics from the Central District of California show substantial skew. Here, one district judge appears to be
the predominant favorite for being assigned patent cases. Coming in
at between 5-6 of the case load, three other judges are not even close
seconds–but are still significant considering that they match or exceed the highest percentage of case load seen by the top patent jurist
in the Northern District of Illinois. The patent assignments to other
judges are less than 5%.
Table 8. Central District of California
Patents as % of Docket
CD CA
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No strong correlation appears between the number of patent
opinions reversed with the size of a judge’s patent docket. See Figure
4. Four judges with only 2% of their workload had high reversal
rates; but so did the judge with a 10% workload.

224
225
226
227
228

Id.
C.D. CAL. GEN. ORD. NO. 05-06 § 3.2.1.
Id.
Id.
C.D. CAL. GEN. ORD. NO. 05-06 § 3.2.2.
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Figure 4: CD CA Patent Reversals to Docket
Patent Reversal Rate to % of Patents on Docket
CD CA
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Conclusion: The Central District of California practices a assignments similar to that proposed by H.R. 5418, but no negative correlation exists between reversal rates and assignments.
5. The Eastern District of Virginia: Equitable Distribution
The Eastern District of Virginia has been nicknamed the rocket
docket for good reason: this district is the quickest of all districts in
regards to patent litigation.229 The Eastern District of Virginia, was
ranked eighth in volume for the period 1995-1996, and was favored
for years as a patent rocket docket because of a reputation as the
quickest judicial districts for patent cases, with a resolution mean time
of .43 years.230 In 2001, the Eastern District of Virginia led all other
district courts in the shortest time to resolution with a mean of .43
231
years; in contrast the mean time for all district courts is 1.12 years.
232
In, the Eastern District of Virginia , the data suggest that blind
assignment process is actually practiced and no one judge hears a larger number of patent cases than another. See Table 9.

229

Moore, supra note 198, at 19, Table 3.
Id.
231 Id.
232 T.S. Ellis, III, Quicker and Less Expensive Patent Enforcement of Patents in the United
States Courts, 5 CASRIP PUBLICATION SERIES: STREAMLINING INT’L INTELL. PROP. 11, 14
(1999).
230
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Table 9. Eastern District of Virginia.
Patents as % of Docket
ED VA
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Here, reversal rates were overall low for all judges. Only one judge
experienced reversals. See Figure 1. This reversal rate was unremarkable — around 9%.
Figure 5. ED VA Patent Reversals to Docket
Patent Reversal Rate to % of Patents on Docket
ED VA
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Conclusion: The Eastern District of Virginia actually practices
equitable random distribution of patent cases with little ill affect on
the reversal rate. Again, no strong correlation appears between reversals and caseload.
6. Northern District of Illinois: Equitable Assignment Decks
The Northern District of Illinois historically has been one of the
busiest patent district courts.233 For more than 50 years, the Northern
233

See Holderman, supra note 8, at 4.
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234

District has used a random assignment system. An important goal
of the rules and procedures for case assignment and reassignment
procedures is to secure “an equitable distribution of cases, both in
quantity and kind, among the judges.” 235
The case assignment system is computerized. Both civil cases
and criminal cases first are grouped into categories, usually by the
type of case. The workload is balanced as the case types for each
category are chosen to generate about the same amount of judicial
236
work. Each category has its own “assignment deck” containing the
name of each regular active judge on full assignment. Senior judges
appear half as often. After verification of the case number and category, the computer “shuffles” the assignment deck to pick a judge
from one of the unused names remaining in the assignment deck for
the category selected. Once assigned, computerized reassignment
procedures ensure the equitable distribution of the caseload.237 Such a
distribution serves to provide the new judge with a calendar that is
reasonably close to the average in terms of workload.238
Just as in the Senate Subcommittee testimony, all but one of the
judges’ workloads exceeded 5%. Even with such emphasis placed on
random case assignment, the statistics show that two of the judges
average 1.5 to 2 times as many patent items on the docket for the
years 2001-2006. See Table 10. Moreover, the low number of patent
cases to the other judges is most likely a result of the equitable case
distribution system enforced by the local court rules, not a scarcity of
patent cases–the Northern District of Illinois is one of the top district
courts in overall patent volume. The remaining assignments follow an
expected curve, accounting for some senior judges having as little as
half the workload of an active judge.

234

N.D. Ill. LR.40.1 (committee comment).
N.D. Ill. LR40.1(a). Assignment of Cases: General.
236 “Prior to the introduction of the computerized assignment system, physical decks of
assignment cards were used. The terms ‘assignment deck; and even ‘assignment card’ continue
in use as metaphors to describe the manner in which the computer operates.” N.D. Ill. LR 40.1
Committee Comment.
237 N.D. Ill. LR 40.1 (d).
238 N.D. Ill. Court Rules, at 14-16.
235
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Table 10. Northern District of Illinois
Patents as % of Docket
ND ILL
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Conclusion: The Northern District of Illinois appears to practice
equitable case distribution, but reversal rates are consistently inconsistent. See Figure 6.
Figure 6. ND ILL Patent Reversals to Docket
Patent Reversal Rate to % of Patents on Docket
ND ILL
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B. Criticisms of the H.R. 5418 Proposal
H.R. 5418 oversimplifies a problem that has many complex variables. H.R. 5418 makes at least the five simplifying assumptions:
1) the system is broken;
2) that the greater the number of docket assignments, the greater
the number of opinions, and with the greater number of opinions, come fewer reversals;
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3) technically trained law clerks will perform better than nontechnically trained law clerks; and
4) forum shopping already exists as evidenced by the consolidation of patent cases in a small set of courts with the composition
of the set changing from year to year, so adding more certainty to
judge selection won’t change the picture;
1. It’s Not Broken
Critics of the proposed legislation have offered various criticisms
of this bill. First, many, even including Judge Ellis239, do not think the
system is broken. By some standards, the U.S. patent system is a
model of efficiency.240 For example, Japan has a specialized patent
241
trial court system. In a comparison of the U.S. and Japanese patent
systems, the time from the filing of a case in the U.S. District Court to
its resolution was compared to cases reaching final judgment in Japanese patent courts.242 For cases terminating during the twelve month
period ending June, 30, 1998, the median time for U.S. patent cases
was 8 months as compared to Japanese intellectual property cases of
243
1-2 years.
Still others criticize the data presented at the Subcommittee
Hearing, opining that the creation of judges with specialized patent
expert would be “an inefficient solution to a nonexistent problem.”244
First, Professor Moore’s statistics on reversal rates are inconsistent,245
and second, overlooks the large number of district rulings that are
246
Claim construction is an extremely narrow area,
never appealed.
and the smaller the data sample, the worse the reversal rates appear.

239 See Improving Federal Court Adjudication of Patent Cases: Hearing before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 2 (2005).
240 Setsuko Asami, Japan-U.S. Patent Infringement Litigation Comparison: A Visit to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, CASRIP NEWSLETTER, Fall 1998, available at http://www.law.washington.edu/CASRIP/Newsletter/Vol5/newsv5i3asami.htm#top.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 See id. at tbl. 1-2.
244 Paul M. Shoenhard, Judging Trial Judges, IP LAW AND BUSINESS, March 2006, available
at http://www.ropesgray.com/files/Publication/0f6472fc-e2b7-489f-92e2-a44b949bbeed/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ca41a2a3-a964-44ad-8d25aa9f019318d0/Article_March_2006_Judging_Trial_Judges_Schoenhard.pdf. (last visited Jan. 31,
2007).
245 “Although she reports a claim construction reversal rate of 34.5 percent, these reversals
only result in 29.7 percent of claim construction cases being reversed or vacated by the court
according to statistics Moore has published elsewhere.” Id.
246 Id.
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Outside the narrow area of claim construction, for example, federal judges’ performance on patent trials is similar to that in all civil
trials. For example, of the 2,744 patent lawsuits terminated in fiscal
year 2004, 2646 were disposed of before trial–a 3.6% trial rate that is
only slightly higher than the 2% of all federal civil cases do not settle
247
before trial. However, even though the numbers seems small, there
is 1.8 times difference in the rate. In the small sample of data for the
district courts studied here for 5 years, the rate is 11.20% of all docketed patent items to issued patent opinions to 8.99% of all non-patent
docketed items to issued non-patent opinions. For this period, patent
opinions issued at a slightly reduced rate, 1.25 x times the rate of nonpatent opinions.
2. Technical Expertise Does Not Equal Fewer Reversals
H.R. 5418 provides funds for hiring law clerks with expertise in
technical matters arising in patent and plant variety protection cases.
Presumably, this position is similar to that of the technical assistant in
the CAFC. However, what sort of technical expertise should one
have in the broad range of patents? Pharmaceutical, biotechnology,
mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, nanotechnology? Patent cases are not the only complex and infrequent case types. For
example, judges hear only one espionage case every five years.248 Securities and antitrust cases are similarly complex.
Aside from the issues of breadth of the technical patent matters,
others point to studies which suggest that even technology savvy
judges do no better than liberal-arts educated judges.249 The study by
Professor Kimberly Moore found that there is no difference in the
likelihood that judges with technical backgrounds will construe claims
differently than those judges without technical backgrounds. 250 A
recent review of 1,400 appeals found that district court judges with
bachelors, or masters-in-science, degree have a 67% affirmance rate,
which is better than the average of 60% found in this report.251 How247

Id.
Improving Federal Court Adjudication of Patent Cases: Hearing before the H. Subcomm.
on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 69
(2005) (statement of Thomas S. Ellis III, Chief Justice, Eastern District of Virginia), available at
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju23816.000/hju23816_0.HTM#40
249 See generally, Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent
Cases?, 12 FED. CIR. B.J. 1, 11 (2002).
250 Id.
251 See LegalMetric Press Release, EWORLDWIRE, Aug. 22, 2006, http://www.eworldwire.
com/pressreleases/15326 (“LegalMetric, LLC is a St. Louis-based company specializing in the
analysis of district court dockets, in preparation of Judge Reports and District Reports as litigation tools for legal professionals.”).
248
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ever, the same report found that the best performing judges, with an
252
affirmance rate of 71%, were those with Ivy-League degrees.
Supporters of specialized judges point to specialized courts in the
United States–tax, bankruptcy, and administrative courts. Creation
of a specialized patent trial court system in the United States, similar
to bankruptcy courts, has historically been controversial and rejected.253 Specialized patent and intellectual property courts currently
exist in six countries, in addition to European Union’s proposed pat254
ent court system.
3. Magistrate Judges Should Not Be Excluded
Because magistrate judges are appointed by Article III judges,
under 28 U.S.C. §631, and not by the President as the bill requires,
magistrate judges are ineligible for designation. Presumably, magistrate judges were not included because their duties vary so much from
court to court. However, this bill should be modified to allow for designation of magistrate judges for three reasons: 1) magistrate judges
issue patent opinions in some court; 2) magistrate judges account for a
significant percentage of pre-trial discovery in patent cases; and, 3)
several patent-prominent district courts would not have the minimum
requisite number of judges to qualify for the pilot program.
First, magistrate judges in some courts decide patent cases and
account for reversals. For example, in the Northern District of California, magistrate judges issued approximately 37, or 14%, of all patent opinions during this period, while accounting for none of the reversals. The Eastern District of Texas and the Northern District of
Illinois similarly have magistrate judges decide patent cases.
Second, even in those district in which magistrate judges do not
issue patent opinions, the magistrate judges account for a substantial
percentage of patent activity on the docket. In the Eastern District of
Virginia and the Central District of California, the magistrate judges
have the same percentage of patents in their dockets as do active
judges. See Table 11.

252
253
254

See id.
See Pegram, supra note 27, at 765-72.
Id.
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Table 11. Comparison of Magistrate Judges and Judges: Patents as Percentage of Total Docket
District
Court
E.D. TX
N.D. CA
E.D. VA
N.D. ILL
C.D. CA

Article III
Judges
3.51%
2.69%
0.72%
1.77%
2.45%

Magistrate
Judges
.75%
4.97%
0.5%
1.47%
2.52%

Finally, excluding magistrate judges eliminates several important
district courts from the pilot program. For example, none of the
courts in Texas would qualify.
4. Judge Shopping
Designating patent judges will add certainty to “judge shopping”
in forum selection. Presently, defendants and plaintiffs both shop for
either the quickest or slowest courts with the highest and lowest re255
versal rates–whichever suits their interests. The problem of “judge
shopping” is added to the mix by designating and codifying “patent
judges” under H.R. 5418. Another important goal of the case assignment system is that “no one should be able to manipulate the assignment system in order to determine in advance which judge will get a
case where the assignment is by lot.” 256
As a result, courts take the security and secrecy of judge assignment seriously. For example, the local court rules of the Northern
District of Illinois explicitly address this concern and provide for enforcement. Any person that violates the case assignment procedures
“shall be punished for contempt of court.”257
For obvious security reasons, the deputies assigning the cases do
not have access to the software that sets up the assignment decks.
The deputies responsible for setting up the decks do not assign
cases. This system together with the changes in the make up of
the deck due to equalization and the shuffling of the names prior

255
256
257

See Moore, supra note 85.
N.D. Ill. LR40.1(c) committee cmt.
N.D. Ill. LR40.1(c) (emphasis added) (italics added).
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to the actual assignment assures that staff cannot determine in
258
advance the name of the judge to whom a case will be assigned.
Today, there is still an element of equitableness and randomness
in patent case assignments–even in those jurisdictions where some
judges are unofficial patent judges. At the very least, this aspect of
case assignment is not widely known, as evidenced by the bill hearings
and testimony.
5. Practice Does Not Make Perfect
The data for these selected courts can be summarized in the table
below. The courts with the overall best records for reversals do not
all follow the H.R. 5418 model. The highest overall reversal rates are
also in a court practicing the proposed H.R. 5418 case assignment
method. See Table 12 - 14. No strong correlation seems to exist between equitable case assignment procedures and designated patent
judge assignment.
Table 12. Comparison of Court Averages (magistrates included)

District
Court
E.D. TX
N.D. CA
E.D. VA
N.D. ILL
C.D. CA

Overall
Reversal
Rate to
Patent
Opinions
1.32%
1.89%
6.25%
7.10%
22.92%

Case
Assignment
System
H.R. 5418
Equitable
Equitable
Equitable
H.R. 5418

Patents as
Percentage
of Total
Docket
2.61%
3.37%
0.64%
1.74%
2.51%

Overall
Reversal
Rate to
Patent
Docket
0.00%
0.27%
0.72%
1.98%
0.36%

Table 13. Comparison of Court Averages (no magistrate judges)

District
Court
E.D. TX
N.D. CA
E.D. VA
258

Id.

Overall
Reversal
Rate to
Patent
Opinions
0
2.2%
6.25%

Case
Assignment
System
H.R. 5418
Equitable
Equitable

Patents as
Percentage
of Total
Docket
3.51%
2.69%
0.72%

Overall
Reversal
Rate to
Patent
Docket
0.00%
0.41%
1.04%
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N.D. ILL
C.D. CA

6.47%
22.92%

Equitable
H.R. 5418

1.77%
2.45%

[4:287
2.03%
0.69%

Table 14. Comparison of Court Averages (magistrate judges only)

District
Court
E.D. TX
N.D. CA
E.D. VA
N.D. ILL
C.D. CA

Overall
Reversal
Rate to
Patent
Opinions
11.11%
0
0
5.88%
0

Case
Assignment
System
H.R. 5418
Equitable
Equitable
Equitable
H.R. 5418

Patents as
Percentage
of Total
Docket
.75%
4.97%
0.5%
1.47%
2.52%

Overall
Reversal
Rate to
Patent
Docket
1.47%
0
0
1.54%
0

Combining the data for all judges from these courts yields that
the reversal rates for judges deciding 3 or more cases a year is 4.57%
versus 4.67% for judges deciding fewer than 3, if they decided any
patent cases at all. The percentage of the patent workload for those
judges is only slightly higher: 3.71% to 2.27%.
Similar studies indicate that the results in these five courts are
not anomalous. A preliminary report by a private data firm, examining1400 appeals, has found that district court judges who have heard a
minimum of 100 patent cases have an identical affirmance rate,
around 60%, as those judges that have heard fewer cases.259
At least for these top five patent courts, for these top patent
judges, and for this time period, the amount of docket assignments to
designated patent judges does not appear to correlate to a lower reversal rate. More experience does not cause lower reversal rates.
C. “Secrets” of Success?
If there is not strong correlation between the rate of reversals
and the percentage of the workload, what explains the relative success
in terms of reversals, and speed of adjudication, of a small court like
the Eastern District of Virginia or the Eastern District of Texas?
Why would the Northern District of Illinois, with as similar assignment system to the Eastern District of Virginia, be cited for its high
reversal rates? Why would an assignment system similar to that prac-

259

See LegalMetric Press Release, supra note 251.
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ticed by the Central District of California provide better or different
results than the Eastern District of Texas?
Possible answers lie in an examination of two indisputably respected and successful forums: the ITC and the Eastern District of
Virginia. Both are known for the speed, and the ITC is especially
noted for its low reversal rate. What is the secret?
1. The Eastern District of Virginia: The Master Docket
There are three main ingredients to the success of patent litigation in the Eastern District: 1) the early setting of a fixed and “immutable” trial date; 2) a culture supporting a fixed and immutable trial
260
date; and 3) a master docket.
The trial dates are rigorously maintained. Judge Ellis has never
granted a motion to continue a civil trial in twelve years.261 For example, even a serious heart attack suffered by one the primary attorneys
262
on the way to trial only delayed the trial until the following day.
This discipline is practiced by judges as well: judges must promptly
consider and decide various non-dispositive and dispositive motions
during the court of the trial.263
The absence of a judge is no reason to delay a trial because of a
264
feature unique to the Eastern District: the master docket. The master docket system has been in effect in the Eastern District since the
1950s.265
As of 1999, no other district court used the master docket con266
A
cept; instead, judges have individual dockets assigned to them.
judge will deal with those cases on their individual docket from begin267
ning to end. If a judge becomes ill or absent for any reason, or has
conflicts with other delayed trials on their docket, another judge does
not step in–the cases are delayed.268 In the master docket concept,
all cases are not assigned to individual judges to hear all proceedings
269
relating to that case from beginning to end. If a judge is unavailable,
another judge will step in to hear that portion of the proceeding.270
260

T.S. Ellis, III, supra note 122, at 12-13.
Id. at 13.
262 Id.
263 Id.
264 Id.
265 Id. at 14 (stating that Senior District Judge Albert Bryan was instrumental in developing
the system and is still hearing cases).
266 Id. at 13.
267 Id.
268 Id.
269 Id.
270 Id.
261
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The absence of a judge is never a reason to postpone a trial or hearing
271
in the Eastern District.
The master docket system, however, is voluntary and hence frag272
ile–a single new judge could decide not to participate. As a result,
the system may not scale well to an extremely large district court such
as the Northern District of Illinois.
2. ITC: Discovery
One important difference between the ITC and most district
court proceedings is in discovery.273 ITC discovery procedures must
be completed quickly because there must be a briefing, a hearing, and
a decision by the Administrative Law Judge within nine months of
issuing an Initial Determination.274 Another difference is that a staff
ITC Investigative Attorney participates in the discovery process.275
3. Eastern District of Texas: Rules of Practice for Patent Cases
The Eastern District of Texas has formulated a set of “Rules of
276
Practice for Patent Cases before the Eastern District of Texas.” On
February 22, 2005, the Eastern District Court implemented a system
277
of uniform patent rules as part of their local rules.
These rules apply to all civil actions filed in or transferred to this
Court which allege infringement of a utility patent in a complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim or third party claim, or which
seek a declaratory judgment that a utility patent is not infringed,
is invalid or is unenforceable.278
These rules augment the discovery rules of Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 26.279 First, the Initial Case Management Statement280 must
also address, among others, the following patent claim specific issues:
1) any modifications to the deadlines imposed by the Patent Rules; 2)

271

Id.
Id. at 14.
273 See Pegram, supra note 27, at 765-72.
274 Id.
275 Id.
276 E.D. Tex. P.R., available at
http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/Rules/LocalRules/Documents/Appendix%20M.pdf.
277 General Order Adopting Uniform Patent Rules, E.D. Tex. Gen. Order 05-8, available at
www.txed.uscourts.gov.
278 E.D. Tex. P.R. 1-2.
279 E.D. Tex. P.R. 2-5.
280 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f).
272
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whether live testimony will be heard at a Claim Construction Hearing;
281
and, 3) need for limits on discovery relating to claim construction.
Within 10 days after the Initial Case Management Conference,
the plaintiff must serve on all parties a “Disclosure of Asserted Claims
and Preliminary Infringement Contentions.”282
These rules are flexible; judges may opt out of this rule by enter283
Accordingly, the court may “accelerate, extend,
ing an order.
eliminate, or modify the obligations or deadlines set forth” in these
Patent Rules based on the following factors of a case, such as the
complexity of the case, the number of patents, claims, products, or
parties involved.284
4. Northern District of California: Local Patent Rules
The Northern District of California enacted Local Rule for Practice for Patent Cases, effective January 1, 2001.285 These rules were in
effect for the period that the data were collected and apply to all civil
actions originating in or transferred into the district that allege infringement of a utility patent in any claim, counterclaim, or third party
claim.286 The rules apply for declaratory judgments that a utility patent is infringed, invalid, or otherwise unenforceable.287
The patent rules are comprehensive, tailored to patent adjudication, and provide guidance for each step of the process. In addition to
the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties
in a patent case must adhere to additional requirements and deadlines
in planning, discovery, confidentiality, and presentation of evidence.
In issues of claim construction, separate Claim Construction Hearings
are held. The parties must provide additional Claim Construction
briefs in preparation for the hearing.
For example, the rules describe in detail how each party must
present the initial closures as follows:
Separately for each opposing party, the “Disclosure of Asserted
Claims and Preliminary Infringement Contentions” shall contain
the following information:
(a) Each claim of each patent in suit that is allegedly infringed by
each opposing party;
281
282
283
284
285
286
287

E.D. Tex. P.R. 2-1(a).
E.D. Tex. P.R. 3-1.
See generally Home Page for E.D. Tex., www.txed.uscourts.gov.
E.D. Tex. P.R. 1-2.
E.D. Tex. P.R. 1-3.
E.D. Tex. P.R. 1-2.
Id.
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(b) Separately for each asserted claim, each accused apparatus,
product, device, process, method, act, or other instrumentality
(“Accused Instrumentality”) of each opposing party of which the
party is aware. This identification shall be as specific as possible.
Each product, device, and apparatus must be identified by name
or model number, if known. Each method or process must be
identified by name, if known, or by any product, device, or apparatus which, when used, allegedly results in the practice of the
claimed method or process;
(c) A chart identifying specifically where each element of each
asserted claim is found within each Accused Instrumentality, including for each element that such party contends is governed by
35 U.S.C. § 112(6), the identity of the structure(s), act(s), or material(s) in the Accused Instrumentality that performs the
claimed function;
(d) Whether each element of each asserted claim is claimed to be
literally present or present under the doctrine of equivalents in
the Accused Instrumentality;
(e) For any patent that claims priority to an earlier application,
the priority date to which each asserted claim allegedly is entitled; and
(f) If a party claiming patent infringement wishes to preserve the
right to rely, for any purpose, on the assertion that its own apparatus, product, device, process, method, act, or other instrumentality practices the claimed invention, the party must identify,
separately for each asserted claim, each such apparatus, product,
device, process, method, act, or other instrumentality that incorporates or reflects that particular claim. 288
In two recent 2006 decisions,289 the CAFC has affirmed that parties must comply with the requirements of the Patent Local Rules for
the Northern District of California. “These decisions are a strong indication that the Northern District's Patent Local Rules have real
teeth, providing district court judges with considerable discretionary
power in ensuring that parties comply with them, even when failing to
do so is outcome determinative.”290 Dismissals based on enforcement
288

E.D. Tex. P.R. 3-1.
See generally 02 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Sys., Inc., 467 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir.
2006); Safeclick, LLC v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 2006 WL 3017347 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 23, 2006).
290 Eric W. Bass & Jeffrey M. Fisher, Federal Circuit Affirms: Local Patent Rules Have
Strong Bite, IPFRONTLINE, Dec. 19, 2006, http://www.ipfrontline.com/depts/article.asp?id=
13694&deptid=4 (last visited Nov. 14, 2008).
289
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of local rules in patent cases are also harder to overturn, because
those are subject to abuse-of-discretion review; whereas “claim con291
struction” or summary judgments are reviewed de novo.
The Eastern District of Texas implemented their local rules
based on the rules in the Northern District of California, which provide “a structure for the unique ‘claims construction’ portion of a patent case and move cases along through the initial stages with a minimum of fuss and attention by a busy judge.”292 In addition to experienced trial judges, these rules have been identified as common feature
in the success and popularity of this district court with patent holders.293
Other district courts have taken note of the Northern District’s
local patent rules and have used them as a model. The Western District of Pennsylvania adopted local patent rules that incorporate several features of the rules that have generally been in effect in the
Northern District of California and employed by various individual
judges around the country.
In contrast to the rules of the Northern District of California,
however, the local patent rules for the Western District of Pennsylvania contain provisions that encourage an even swifter and more
comprehensive approach to patent litigation. To accomplish these
objectives, the new Pennsylvania rules further provide additional cost
and time saving measures, including default protective orders to preserve confidentiality, Infringement Contention Timetable, and a
Model Chart For Disputed Claim Terms, among others. 294
Effective April 3, 2006, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of California has issued proposed new rules of local
practice for patent cases, also modeled after the Northern District of
California. These local rules cover, among other issues, initial disclosures in patent cases, and case management and responses to discov295
ery. Like in other district courts, several improvements were made,

291

Id.
Michael C. Smith, Rocket Docket: Marshall Court Leads Nation in Hearing Patent Cases,
TEX. B. J., Dec. 2006, at 1045, available at
http://www.texasbar.com/Template.cfm?Section=Past_Issues&Template=/ContentManagement/
ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=16308.
293 Id.
294 Kenneth R. Adamo & Robert C. Kahrl., Federal District Court in Pittsburgh Adopts
Specialized Local Rules for Patent Cases, JONES DAY, Jan. 2005,
http://www.jonesday.com/pubs/pubs_detail.aspx?pubID=1366 (last visited Nov. 14, 2008).
295 See S.D. Cal. Gen. Order 549, and S.D. Cal. Patent L.R. 1.1-4.5, available at
http://www.casd.uscourts.gov/index.php?page=general-orders.
292
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including a “Joint Claim Construction Worksheet” and a “Timeline
296
for Patent Cases.”
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the reversal data for the five districts studied, no apparent correlation exists between the number of cases a patent judge
hears and the reversal rate. Furthermore, several of the districts are
currently practicing the proposed case assignment system proposed in
H.R. 5418. For these courts, the overall performance of the court is
not correlated with this type of assignment system.
As the data suggests, magistrate judges already shoulder a substantial amount of patent-discovery and preliminary-motions work in
all districts. In some district courts, the magistrate judges decide the
cases, contributing to the overall reversal rate. Excluding magistrate
judges from the system ignores their impact on patent adjudication.
Additionally, the exclusion of magistrate judges by H.R. 5418 eliminates two of the top patent district courts from receiving additional
funding to improve patent litigation.
The underlying secret to more efficient and accurate patent decisions lies not in the assignment system, but in the local rules employed
by the district courts. Patent specific rules, especially with respect to
discovery, ameliorate the problems caused by infrequent hearing of
patent cases and reduce mistakes. Patent specific deadlines ensure
the timely processing of the case and reduce costs. Patent rules provide the institutional learning necessary to bridge the experience gap
caused by the loss of a trained patent jurist. The money spent in training law clerks and judges in the pilot program is lost when one of
these trained people leave.
Rather than initiating a pilot program that merely formalizes existing court procedures, a pilot program should be initiated that implements and measures the effect of a uniform set of patent specific
rules in the busiest as well as the poorest performing district courts.
Uniformity in rules would reduce forum shopping, costs, and offset
the lack of experience of judges who infrequently hear patent cases.
Coupled with uniform patent rules, the addition of old-fashioned virtues of strict adherence to schedules, as in the Eastern District of Virginia, would improve patent adjudication.
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See id.

